Here is Someone Braun saying something:
Some Russellians attempt to do so by saying that speakers may fail to distinguish correctly between the semantic content of an utterance and its pragmatic "implications". Let's consider an analogous example. Many semanticists maintain that utterances of (12) and (13) express the same, or logically equivalent, propositions.
(12) Mary turned the ignition key and the car's engine started.
(13) The car's engine started and Mary turned the ignition key.
Yet many ordinary speakers of English would judge that utterances of (12) and (13) can differ in truth value. To explain away these common intuitions, many semanticists say that utterances of sentences of the form P and Q typically pragmatically convey ("suggest", "implicate", or "insinuate") the proposition that P and then Q. Thus utterances of (12) and (13) usually pragmatically convey different propositions. A hearer may (reasonably) believe that one of those conveyed propositions is true and that the other is false. So a hearer who fails to distinguish correctly between what the utterances semantically express, and what the speaker is "getting across," may mistakenly judge that the two utterances themselves differ in truth value.
Here's what I don't get: (12) and (13) are being offered out of any particular context. In the context of no context! Braun isn't asserting them, nor is he presenting a situation in which they're being asserted by hypothetical persons, none of that. He's just displaying the sentences. So why is it, given that there's no particular context, and nothing that any particular utterer (since they're not presented as utterances) might mean to do with them, that we still get the supposedly "pragmatic" reading of "and" as "and then" or "and so"? Isn't this kind of a problem? And if we're just used to giving sentences like (12) and (13) their supposedly pragmatically-derived readings, then how do we account for our not giving "and" that kind of reading to sentences like "John ordered steak and Susan ordered salmon"? The answer can't (can it?) be something about the sort of sentences involved, because if that sort could be specified noncircularly, one could deny that it's pragmatic at all, and just say that in that sort of sentence "and" has this sort of meaning. (Though many would probably find that distasteful anyway.)