M. Bréhier said to and asked of Merleau-Ponty, following the latter's presentation of the paper "The Primacy of Perception", this: "Thus your doctrine, in order not to be contradictory, must remain unformulated, only lived. But is a doctrine which is only lived still a philosophical doctrine?". Merleau-Ponty's reply began with the statement given in the title of this post (as flagrant an example of the policy formerly observed here of decoupling post title from post content as one could wish for), but, well, I'm not so sure (re-reading that I find it unaccountable that I failed to mention Kierkegaard's portrait of the knight of infinite faith, which may not be directly on point but is at least relevant and which is by far my favorite part of Fear and Trembling).(Or rather: assuredly a life is itself not a doctrine, but a life may surely be lived philosophically.)
It is moderately interesting to come across this general sort of paradox being broached, though, as it had once again occurred to me when reading about one of the better known advocates or thoughtful defenders of ordinariness and ordinary life of recent years, namely, David Foster Wallace.1 Because, of course, to go on about this stuff (to think about it at length, even) just isn't part of the sort of life thus praised—in many cases (in Wallace's, for instance) one gets the impression that the putative absence of those sorts of preoccupations is one of the chief attractions.
1. I can't but point out that, just as DFW himself did, the author of that article uses "q.v." incorrectly.