As I mentioned earlier, though not in so many words, I'm reading Freedom and Responsibility. RIGHT NOW. In fact I just read the paragraph beginning thus:
Any claim that is justified by the practical point of view would have to involve a concept that any attempt to engage in practical reasoning gives us reason to employ. But not all such concepts can allow us to justify such claims. For instance, because I have defined practical reasoning as reasoning that attempts to determine what we have most reason to do, the concept of `the act we have most reason to perform' is
and then the sentence ends "one that any attempt to engage in practical reasoning gives us reason to employ." (pp 72–3), but I thought it would end by concluding that that concept is not justified by the practical point of view. Obviously if practical reasoning is the attempt to determine what one has most reason to do, someone engaging in practical reasoning has an instrumental reason to employ that concept in his actual deliberations, and maybe that's what's meant. But I suppose I want to make an analogy to the old line about how, back in the good old days when the meter was defined with reference to the meter bar, it neither was nor wasn't a meter long. It seems odd to say that, not only is practical reasoning defined in terms of a particular concept, it also gives you reason to use that concept. This is mostly irrelevant, though, so I'm free to be totally wrong here.
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