I had half an idea to whine at length about the various flaws in this little squib, but obviously it's not meant to be a good argument or anything like that, so treating it as if it's fallen away from some such standard isn't really apropos—suffice it to say that it's facile and glib in an aggravating way, probably beyond what the form calls for; what follows, then, is extraneous.
I am told, or perhaps gently exhorted, "you remember the teleological suspension of the ethical", and I do, Leon, I do—only I don't, based on what you go on to say, think that you do. A pro-lifer praising someone for not having an abortion is not suspending the ethical, and if the telos in virtue of which they were suspending the ethical were something as general as "life", one would expect them to treat all people who carry babies to term similarly (indeed, this generality is part of the problem). That whole section just doesn't make very much sense; I really haven't the foggiest notion what Wieseltier thinks he's saying.
That crap about the "etymological origins" of "integrity" really boils my canker, though. Even saying "in its etymological origins" annoys me, though I realize that's probably idiosyncratic. The idea that what a word meant "originally" (usually the person making some such claim actually means "at some more or less arbitrary point in the past", and I suspect Wieseltier is thinking, if he is thinking of anything in particular and not just armchairing* things, of integritas, which doesn't even really support his assertion (if you can even make a coherent assertion out of the motley things he claims that "integrity" originally referred to; he gives a list, apparently in apposition, of things that are not the same), since the first definition is "completeness", not "wholeness", especially since it can be aptly translated by … "integrity"—in other words the appeal to the Latin meaning doesn't narrow things down) is necessarily going to have anything to do with what the word now means, or be relevant at all to a discussion of the concept it denotes, is, one would have thought, laughable, and I say this as someone who often finds etymologies revealing. (An example that's not perhaps particularly strong as an instance of etymology coming to the rescue but which is the only one that comes to mind is "mistake"; my reaction to Austin's famous example with the donkeys is to say, ah, of course, he shot his neighbor's donkey by mistake in the case in which he wrongly took his neighbor's for his own.) But those cases are often ones of reconfiguration of the way I look at a word, or a relation of words (I believe I've mentioned before my disappointment at learning that "rue" the feeling and "rue" the plant have distinct origins), but they only have their effect because I can see how whatever it is that I'm getting from the etymological angle fits with, and perhaps explains (or explains-and-modifies in some satisfying way: this isn't an exact science) what I already thought about the word. Etymological data aren't bludgeons with which to tell people what words really mean; you have to relate whatever you get from them to that is already recognizable. Wieseltier doesn't even attempt to do that, probably because if he did, he might have to soften his point (he might also have to acknowledge that "being immediately what one is" doesn't necessarily have anything to do with it).
*Someone once, in print or in the website of a print magazine, used "armchair" or some conceptually similar noun as part of a putdown of the ns plus one; this is of course next to impossible to search for and I swear to god, it's driving me batty. (I thought I had published this, but evidently had not; in the interim I remembered: "delphic armchair", and I encountered it first on Dial M. It was in TNR, but wasn't applied to the ns plus one. Writ by Taruskin, whose Text and Act was just peremptorily recalled from me, for some damn course or other. Sheesh!)
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