(It is kind of strange to write a post when one's blog is password-protected and one knows exactly who has the password (assuming they haven't shared).)
I presume that the aphorism of Lichtenberg's most often cited in contemporary Anglophone (at last, a legitimate use for the term) philosophical discussion is the one about the cogito and "es denkt" (though there are many others of interest even on similar themes), which begins thus:
Wir werden uns gewisser Vorstellungen bewußt, die nicht von uns abhängen; andere glauben wir wenigstens hingen von uns ab; wo ist die Grenze? Wir kennen nur allein die Existenz unserer Empfindungen, Vorstellungen und Gedanken. Es denkt, sollte man sagen, so wie man sagt: es blitzt.
We become aware of certain representations, which do not depend on us; others believe that we at least depend on ourselves; where is the boundary? We are acquainted only with the existence of our sensations, representations and thoughts. It thinks, one should say, as one says it thunders. (Hollingdale's translation, incidentally, does not include the first two sentences and does not indicate that it has excluded anything.)
And even there what discussion one encounters seems often to take the third sentence quoted as the only one. Thus Parfit in Reasons and Persons takes Lichtenberg straight, but also suggests that Lichtenberg will have a problem; he must "explain the unity of a person's life in an impersonal way". McDowell, on the other hand, in "Reductionism and the First Person", takes Lichtenberg to be ironic:
On this understanding [Parfit's], Lichtenberg is fundamentally Cartesian in the sense I have suggested; he accepts that "consciousness" has its content in a way that requires no context … but it is quite doubtful that we can really conceive thinking as a subjectless occurrence, like a state of the weather, and Lichtenberg's aphorism is much more pointed if we read him as exploiting that fact. … The aphorism goes through the motions of expressing that idea, but we cannot be meant to take it simply in our stride. The point of the aphorism, on this different reading, is to question the basic Cartesian conviction that "consciousness" is self-contained …
Ok. But there's more to the aphorism. Here's how it ends:
Zu sagen cogito, ist schon zu viel, so bald man es durch Ich denke übersetzt. Das Ich anzunehmen, zu postulieren, ist praktisches Bedürfnis.
To say cogito is already too much, as soon as one translates it with "I think". To assume, to postulate the I is a practical necessity.
One may at this point wonder: a necessity for whom? But one may also wonder why this part of the aphorism gets no representation in its invocations. (Obvious exception: Günter Zöller's "Lichtenberg and Kant on the Subject of Thinking.")
At last! A new blog post!
And of course I find nothing better to do than to criticize your translation of the second clause of the first part of the aphorism:
"andere glauben wir wenigstens hingen von uns ab" - I would translate: "of others [i.e. other representations] we at least believe that they depend on us". Not very elegant, I have to admit. So perhaps even better: "others we at least believe to be dependent on us"?
Posted by: germanidealist | December 01, 2010 at 07:44 AM
The lack of punctuation is not helpful, but I think the placement of "wenigstens" counts against your reading.
Zoller notes the oddness of the sentence in a footnote and makes "hingen" the basis for discrimination: “Mach's
reading [which is the same as yours] is improbable considering the occurrence of the subjunctive form, "hingen," which indicates
a subordinate clause following the verb, "glauben."” Which does make it harder to maintain that "others" is the object of glauben and that we aren't talking about something others believe, but on the other hand, "hingen" isn't the right subjunctive form for indirect discourse—this site suggests (if I'm interpreting the italics right) that it's an alternate or altmodisch Konjunktiv II form. So, basically, I find the whole thing confusing.
Posted by: ben w | December 01, 2010 at 08:23 AM
I agree, punctuation would be extremely helpful. The question of the Konjunktivform is interesting, although given how liberal Germans (then and now) tend to use it, I'm not convinced it's decisive. Zoller, who was one of my undergrad teachers, is certainly a trustworthy scholar. But I still disagree. My reading makes more sense in the context. Why would it only be "gewisse" representations, if those weren't to be contrasted with others?
Posted by: germanidealist | December 03, 2010 at 12:35 PM
Well I'm not convinced that's decisive; it sounds as if there are two poles: certain representations that don't depend on us are at one end; we at least (as objects of self-consciousness) are at the other, and we want to know about the continuum.
Posted by: ben w | December 03, 2010 at 01:29 PM
"But one may also wonder why this part of the aphorism gets no representation in its invocations."
My guess: Most people know this Lichtenberg quote from Kripke's quotation of Moore's quotation of Wittgenstein's quotation of Lichtenberg in "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" p. 123, citing Moore's "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33" p. 309, citing what Wittgenstein said in person. Kripke/Wittgenstein/Moore only quote the (now-)famous bit.
Kripke notes that he "ought to have" studied Lichtenberg while writing his book but "haven't done so", in a footnote.
Posted by: Daniel Lindquist | January 03, 2011 at 07:31 PM
People's acquaintance with Lichtenberg might be even further removed that that. Googling for the Moore citation gave me this claim: "Wittgenstein may have got the Lichtenberg quotation from Weininger, op. cit., part II, ch. 7."
I'd be interested to learn how Weininger quotes Lichtenberg.
Posted by: Daniel Lindquist | January 03, 2011 at 07:35 PM
What the hell? I thought I responded to that comment like a week ago.
You can read Geschlecht und Charakter free without charge online (here for instance); the relevant bit (it's in the right part and chapter and everything) seems to be this:
"Lichtenberg, der nach Hume gegen das Ich zu Felde zog, war schon kühner als dieser. Er ist der Philosoph der Unpersönlichkeit und korrigiert nüchtern das sprachliche »Ich denke« durch ein sachliches »es denkt«; so ist ihm das Ich eigentlich eine Erfindung der Grammatiker."
So not even much in the way of direct quotation there at all.
Posted by: ben w | January 12, 2011 at 09:39 PM